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1 •. SUNMARY: Resp 's car was towed to the police pound because

1(,."'-s'r'l l.. t

had two park.1.ng t1.c
· k ets.

At t h e poun d , t h e po 1·1.ce b ro k e 1.nto
·

:::~~

the

f~-li.t

found a small amount of marijuana in the closed but unlocked

rufi,..

~.

.~ nut

loc~ed c-~-an; pe~formed a

glove compartment.

routine inventory search.

Petr was convicted of possession •

They

The South

Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search of the
g~ove c~

The state seeks cert.

unreasonable in light of all the circumstances.

-2~

FACTS: Resp's car r ece ived two tickets in the morning

of the same day (3 a.m. and 10 a.m.).
towed to the police pound.

-

The police then had it

The police had no reason to believe

that the car contained any incriminating evidence or contraband,
nor did they need to search the car to discover the owner.
A police officer at the pound observed several objects, including
a watch, on the dashboard.

He broke into the locked car and

inventoried the objects on the dashboard.

He then opened the

unlocked glove compartment and discovered a small amount of
marijuanae

When resp came to pick up his car at 5:00 that

afternoon, he was arreste d.

Resp was convicted of possession.

The South Dakota Sup. Ct . reversed.

It held that the inventory

was a search and had to be evaluated for reasonableness in iight
of all the circumstances.

It distinguished Cady v. Dombrowski,

41 3- U.S. 433 (1973); Ha r ris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968);
and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), as not covering
this c ase .

It t hen held that it was reasonable

in

t h is c a se for the poli ce to enter the car for the purpose of
removing the objects in plain view from the outside [the court
held t ha t such r emoval plus locking the car would -insulate the
police from all l iability for theft], but that it was not
reasonable t o conduct an exploratory search into closed compartments.
The dissent objected to restricting the police to an inventory
of only t ho se i tems t hat are in plain view within the interior
of an automobile .
1'---"

3. CONTENTIONS : Petr contends that the decision is in
conflict with this Court's decisions in Cady,

Ha~ris,

and Cooper.

It also alleges tha t there is a conflict between the
circuits (cases cited petn a t 9 ) and between the state
supreme courts (cases cited petn at 7-8).
-

The response

tracks the Sup. Ct. decision.
4. DISCUSSION : Although Fourth Amendment questions tend
to be fact-specific, the state courts and at least two circuits

*I ) seem s p li t on the question whether a routine
(CA 5 and CA 8inventory search based solely on the fact of police custody

--

~'----------------------------------------~~
This case would be

is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

-

---

"'--------7',..

an ideal vehicle for deciding t hat i ssue but for the South
Dakota Sup. Ct.'s ruling that r emov al of all objects in plain
view plus locking the car protect s the police from liability
for theft.

This ruling elimi nated t he police department's basic

justification for looking i n the glove compartment.

The case

does present the question whether any justification at all is
necessary for an inventory search, but it might be advisable to
grant cert. only in a case that presents both the threshold
question and the issue of the effect of what seems to be the
most common justification for inventories--protection against
liability for theft.
There is a response.
10113175

Op. in petn.
Block

_!:_I CA 5 has approved pure-custody inventories, see United States
v. Penning :on, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1971), cer~denied, 404
U.S. 854 ( -~Y'/1), while CA 8 has disapproved, see United States
v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Greg Palm

DATE:

No. 75-76

March 29, 1976

South Dakota v. Opperman

The decision below should be affirmed.
concluded that:

(1)

I have

warrentless pol ice "inventories" of

cars temporarily in their possession are "searches" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and (2) weighing the
competing interests involved, such searches are unreasonable.
In recent years, courts increasingly have considered
the issue of the constitutionality of routine inventory searches
of vehicles in temporary police custody.

In an inventory

the contents of the car are thoroughly catalogued, and criminal
evidence seized , if discovered, without a warrant.

Accepting

that the possessory interest acquired by the police under a
forfeiture statute

a~J ows

a warrantless search, Cooper v.

California, 386 u.s. j (l967),*

even the most expansionary reading

* Cooper was convicted of the sale of heroin, wrapped in
brown paper, which he had sold to a police informer. Shortly after th
transaction, Cooper's car was staked out, and he was arrested while
unlocking the car. The car was immediately searched, then impounded,
pursuant to state statute, pending a forfeiture proceeding. One week
later, the police searched it again, discovering in the glove
compartment a piece of brown paper which was later introduced at trial
Title to the car had not passed by the time of the second search.
The Court in Qooper pres ented two factors which it seemed
to indicate would justify the warrantless search of an impounded
vehicle. Firstz the car was held in connection with crim1nal
activity for wh1ch an arrest had been made; the Court seemed to be

2.

'*

of Cooper cannot extend its rationale to cases in which the
police
...__ do not have the right to deny possession to the car's
owner.

Nor can the traditional exigent circumstances exemption

from the warrant requirement justify most inventory searches,
since the vehicles involved in such cases are generally taken
when there is no danger that the car will be removed.

A

car may be towed for violation of a parking regulation (as
in this case), and impounded until it is claimed; a car might
be towed from the scene of an accident, when the driver is
incapacitated; or a car might be impounded for safekeeping,
because the driver has been arrested.

(footnote continued)
pointing out the presence of probable cause for the search.
Second, the car was to be seized under state law for a considerable
period of time; since the police could deny possession of the
car to its owner, they had possessory rights of their own. Because
the relationship between th~ se two factors was not explained,
the correct interpretation of Cooper has been debated.
The most sensible interpretation of CooEer i s that .
the police may search a car, with or without probable cause, if
they have a continuing right to possess it. Justice Black, writing
for the Court,stated:
"It would be unreasonable to hold that the
police, having to retain the car in their custody
for such a length of time, had no right, even for
their own protection, to search it .•· Id. at 61-62.
~<~----- It is difficult to see Cooper's car as an inherently
dangerous object, especially since he was apparently
willing to use it at the time of arrest. But the
reference to self-protection does seem to indicate
that a search in furtherance of the police possessory
interest, rather than a probable cause search for
evidence, was seen by the Court as the central

..
3.
Depending on the circumstances in which they acquire
possession, the police might have reason to suspect that the
car will yield evidence of criminal activity.

In inventory

cases, however, the police seek to justify their intrusion as
primarily based on a

benign ~rpose,

rather than on a desire

to uncover criminal evidence; the benign purpose might be the
~

~/ protection

(~

of public safety, the protection of the driver's

property, or the protection of the police from ....~......11a
liability for theft.

Such a purpose is thought to overcome

a citizen's Fourth Amendment claim against the inventory on one
of I l l two bases.

First, it has been held that an inventory

is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
E.~.,

Fagundes v. United States, 340 F. 2d 673 (CA 1 1965).

Second, it has also been held that, if an inventory is a
search, it is reasonable even without a warrant.

E.~.,

State v.

Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 (1968).
The basis for the argument that a station house inventory
is not a search is essentially that the Fourth Amendment applies
only to investigations to discover criminal evidence.

Some

support for this approach may be found in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
709 (1972), which held that a horne visit by a welfare social
worker was not a search "in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that
(footnote continued}
feature of the case. On that basis, it is hard to see
what Qrobable cause would add to a possessory right in
justifying the intrusion. Rather, Coo~er~ in Justice
BreQnan's P.hrase staQds for the propo 1h~on that the
pol~ce, un~er a forfe~ture statute, are
authorized to
treat the car in their custody as if it were their own."
OGdy v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 453 (1973)(dissenting).

4.
term."

The Court found that such an intrusion

Id. at 317.

into the home was rehabilitative, and not investigative in a
criminal sense.
Wyman's suggestion that only investigative searches
are covered by the Fourth Amendment is unpersuasive.

Terry v.

Ohio, 393 U.S. 1 (1967), although it dealt with a "frisk"
in an investigative context, indicated that even those not

--

suspected of crime have protected Fourth Amendment interests:
"[T]he s ounder course is to recognize that the
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents
of the public on personal security, and to make it
the scope of the particular intrusion . . • a
central element in the analysis of reasonableness."
Id. at 18, n. ' 15.
A citizen's interest in "personal security," which is
the language seemingly invoked by the language of the Amendment
has at its foundation more than a mere desire to avoid criminal
prosectuion.

I would hold, therefore, that an inventory

------------..

search.
I~_..-....

* The Court held alternatively that, if it was a
search, it was reasonable. 400 U.S. at 318-324.
** Moreover, the existence of remedies against
unreasonable searches in other than criminal contexts is possible.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,

403

U~S.

388 (1971).

5.

Assuming that you agree with this conclusion, two
further issues are raised:

(1)

are there good reasons for

dispensing with the warrant requirement, and (2) whether the
resultant warrantless search is reasonable.
The most relevant decision of this Court is Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).

In Cady the police arrested

an off-duty policeman for drunken driving after a late night
accident.

A search of the car, after it was towed to a private

garage, was conducted to discover the revolver which the
arresting officers thought Dombrowski was required to carry.
In the process, the police uncovered blood-stained objects
which led to Dombrowski's conviction for murder.

Id. at 435-439.

The Court accepted the district court's finding that
the routine search was not carried out for the purpose of the
discovery of criminal evidence.

The Court held that warrantle ss

---

searches are permissible to discharge "community caretaking
functions," Id. at 99, and found the search of Dombrowski's car
justified by the "concern for the safety of the general public
who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from
the trunk of the vehicle."

Id at 447.

Dombrowski thus holds that warrants are not required
searches conducted with a benign purpose.

This is equivalent

to the statement that the warrant requirement contained in
the second clause ofthe Fourth Amendment applies only to criminal

investigations.

Considerable support can be marshalled for

this interpretation.

Warrants may only be issued upon probable

cause, which has usually been thought to connote a reasonable
s uspicion that criminal evidence will be found.

In addition,

the jus tification for a warrant has often been based on the
idea that the search for criminal evidence gives rise to special
temptations for offensive activity by the police.

"Its

protection consists in requiring that those inferences [regarding
probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

*~

, Dombrowski thus makes the need for a warrant turn on
the intent of the police in conducting the search, and indicates
that intent is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
The implications of Dombrowski for more common sorts of inventory
cases would appear clear.
towed for a parking

Where, as with the inventory of a car

violatio ~

I

(this

case ~

the benign purpose

is patent, no warrant should be required. *
Even if there are good reasons for dispensing with

* A more difficult problem in determining intent
would be posed by a car search following the driver's arrest for
a crime which seems to be unconnected to the vehicle itself.
Because intent poses a ~ctual issue of great difficulty, the
possibility of pretext is real; the inquiry will be especially
difficult when the police department has a standard procedure
of inventorying all vehicles which come into custody.
~t

~f(r ~\s61 ~(;-\-t~ '""~ ~~

· N\

·,~ ·,~ ~

~\s·~~~~ ~ v8<~~~~~

~flv.Jl.~~~ 'i:.~~ ~

7.

warrants in benign purpose searches, there is the further
issue whether such searches are reasonable.

The search in

Dombrowski was held as reasonable because the danger to public
safety outweighed the driver's interest in the privacy of
his car's contents.

The police reasonably believed that

the car contained a loaded gun, and in a small rural
police district it would have been difficult to post a guard
to assure that the gun did not fall into the hands of someone
who might misuse it.

More generally, four other benign

purposes have been isolated:

protection of the police from

danger, the avoidance of police liability for lost or stolen
property, protection of police reputation from false claims,
and the protection of the owner's property as a service to

The safety interest is at best a make-weight argument.
Barring special circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a
situation in which failure to conduct an inventory would result
in physical harm to the police.

*

The liability issue is

* If police have reasonable cause to suspect that a
bomb is present in a car, then they of course should be able
to search it. But this rare possibility cannot justify routine
inventory searches.

•

8.

stronger as police departments do receive complaints and claims
concerning property missing from stored cars.

As far as legal

liability is concerned, however, a constitutional determination
'--

that the police were not allowed to go further than locking
th

doors of a towed auto would seem conclusive as to their

duties as bailees.

More important, at least as to the search

under consideration, here the South Dakota Supreme Court has
already told us that as a matter of state law, the police will
not be held liable if they lock the car and pick up "plain-view"
items.
The protection of the driver's property is a significant

j interest for both the policeman and the citizen.

It has been

contended that an inventory is unnecessary for this purpose,
since rolling up the windows and locking the doors gives the
owner all the protection that the contents of his car ever have
in normal use.

l

It seems clear, however, that while owners might

leave things of value in cars temporarily, they would not
normally do so for the many days that police custody might last.
Hence, there is a real gain in the protection of property
if cars are inventoried and valuable items are removed for storage.
The same gain could be provided, of course, by posting a guard
at the police lot where the car might be stored; but that could
be prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller jurisdictions.
Against this gain in security for property must be
weighed the violation of secrecy that an inventory implies.

One

9.

element to be considered in such a determination is the
possibility that there might be no property to protect.

The

police in a normal inventory case, unlike the situation in
Dombrowski, will have no reasonable belief as tot he car's
contents.

Another factor is that, even for a towed

-

vehicle, the police will usi ually be able to ascertain the
owner, who will often be in a position to protect the

f;;:fvr ~ property himself, if
fft'~~..Jh' loss is an insurable
~

~~· ~
1--vfO~
Vf/1/V

/;

is not.

*'

he wishes. · A third is that property
loss, whereas a violation of privacy

When the police cannot locate the owner, and have

------

reason to believe that the car contains valuable objects,

•

perhaps they are justified in searching it.

As a routine

matter, however, it
would seem that the protection of
..._______
privacy is more important than the possibility of preventing
theft.

This rule, that special circumstances must be shown to

justify a warrantless inventory, is the one that I recommend
you vote to adopt.

I would thus draw a "bright line"

* Petitioners spend a good deal of tLme arguing how
insignificant the privacy interest is in an automobile while
simultaneously contending that there is a significant possibility
that valuable personal property may be stored in the hidden reaches
of the vehicle. This pos itiop is somewhat inco~nt. I think
the fact that many people place property that they consider
important in their glove compartment or trunk illustrates that
they believe those areas will be free from intrusion, both by
thieves or anyone else. Much in this case turns on the perceptions
one holds about the role of the automobile in our society. It is
my impression that many people treat their cars as an extension of
their homes: they cram it with stereo, books, clothes or other items
that fit their individual life style. Any invasion of the hidden
areas of their cars is an intrusive look into an aspect of their
lives that they have a legitimate right, a bsent special
circumstances, to keep free from view.

1,)
*'

10.

between the exposed interior reaches of the passenger
compartment and the glove compartment, trunk, or other
areas that are hidden from view.

The issue is very close

and rather subjective, and an opposite result is certainly
defensible.
Greg

~

* Petitioners attempt to distinguish the trunk from
an unlocked glove compartment. I don't accept the distinction
since in order to enter the glove compartment illegally, one must
first braaL into the car.
It is concededly harder to break
into a trunk, but that hardly serves a basis on which to turn
the law. (If pressed, however, I would urge as a fQJ.. ll~ack
position the locked glove compartment/unlocked glove compartment
distinction: the locking of the compartment is an affirmative
act (in contrast most domestic car trunks lock automatically)
arguably indicating the owner of the vehiele wishes to keep
something hidden, (on the other hand, it also indicates something
valuable may be inside.)
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SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN

Miscellaneous Thoughts, Dictated in Preparation for the Conference:
1.

An inventory search is for a benign purpose - not

to uncover evidence of crime.
2.

I am inclined to think it is a "search" within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
3.

But the warrant clause certainly does not apply;

nor is "probable cause" a prerequisite.
4.

The question is whether the inventory is reasonable

under the circumstances, and in light of the state interest
implicated.

There are two primary "state interests" (i)

protect personal property left within the car; and (ii)
protect the police in their role as bailees.
5.

Valuables in "plain view" will usually justify action

to safeguard these.

This would not necessarily justify opening

a locked glove compartment or the trunk.
6.

An element in the "reasonableness" of the inventory

search may be the length of time in which the vehicle is in
police custody.

In this case, the custory extended only

during one day.

In larger cities, and under varying circum-

stances, custody could be more or less indefinite.

A police

department rule deferring the inventory search (absent "clear
view" items) might withhold the inventory for, say, 48 hours
to allow the owner to claim the vehicle.

Such a rule, however,

2.
would make little sense if the car had a foreign license,
were involved in an accident and abandoned, or if there were
evidence that the car was stolen.

My inclination is to avoid "bright lines", as reasonableness - by its very nature - depends on the facts and circumstances.

Yet, again especially in large cities where several

thousand cars may be picked up each week, bright lines must
be drawn at least for purposes of administration.
vehicles are parked in a reasonably safe location

If the
(~·&·,

on police protected property, as distinguished from some
public parking lot to which they have been towed), I would
think a 48-hour rule would make sense.
I will await conference discussion before "coming to

rest".

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss
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Miscellaneous Thoughts, Dictated in Preparation for thedConferenc1

1.

An

inventory search is for a benign purpose - not

to uncover evidence of crime.
2.

I am inclined to think it is a "search" within the

meaning of the Fourth .Amendment.
3.

But the warrant clause certainly does not apply;

nor is "probable cause" a prerequisite.
4.

The question is whether the inventory is reasonable

under the circumstances, and in light of the state interest
implicated.

There are two primary "state interests" (i)

protect personal property left within the car; and (ii)
protect the police in their role as bailees.
5.

Valuables in "plain view" will usually justify action

to safeguard these.

This would not necessarily justify opening

a locked glove compartment or the trunk.
6.

An

element in the "reasonableness" of the inventory

search may be the length of time in which the vehicle is in
police custody.

In this case, the custory extended only

during one day.

In larger cities, and under varying circum-

stances, custody could be more or less indefinite.

A police

department rule deferring the inventory search (absent "clear
view" items) might withhold the inventory for, say, 48 hours
to allow the owner to claim the vehicle.

Such a rule, however,

2.
would make little sense if the car had a foreign license,
were involved in an accident and abandoned, or if there were
evidence that the car was stolen.

****
My

inclination is to avoid "bright lines", as reasonable-

ness - by its very nature - depends on the facts and circumstances.

Yet, again especially in large cities where several

thousand cars may be picked up each week, bright lines must
be drawn at least for purposes of administration.
vehicles are parked in a reasonably safe location

If the
~·&·•

on police protected property, as distinguished from some
public parking lot to which they have been towed), I would
think a 48-hour rule would make sense.
I will await conference discussion before "coming to
rest".

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMI!IERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 26, 1976

Re:

7 5-7 6 - South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Bill:
I am happy to oblige by inserting (necessary or not)
after "Constitution" on line 3, page 1 (typewritten draft), the
words ''as applicable to the State of South Dakota under the
14th Amendment. ''

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

t

.:§uprtntt Q}mtrl af1!rt ~th ;§fattg

·~lhtglfingtort. ~.

"f.

2IJ~)l,~

C HAM BER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 26, 1976

Re:

No. 75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Chief:
Please join me. As a matter of nomenclature, would
it not be better to refer to the constitutional provisions
in question as the "Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" rather
than simply the Fourth Amendment, since they are being
applied to a state in this case?
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

To: Justice Powell
From: Greg Palm
Re: The Chief Justice's Opinion in South Dakota
(No. 75-76)

v.

Opperman

Although you voted to "affirm" at Conference I would urge
you to reconsider your vote and circulate a memorandum to the
effect that you are waiting to see what the dissent has to say
(note, however, that there has yet been no dissent assigned;
apparently the other justices are waiting to see if the
Chief's opinion gets a Court) . since you are not yet at rest
in this case. Alternatively, I could draft a dissent or conanrexe
After Conference I never really got a chance to talk
to you about this case.

Apparently you have opted for

distinguishing between the trunk--locked glove compartment
and the unlocked glove compartment--rest of the car.

After

giving the matter more thought I really do not believe there
is any really satisfactory way to distinguish between an
unlocked and locked glove compartment:

the key idea in terms

of privacy expectations is that any item plaeed in a glove
compartment or trunk is hidden from view--thus, the expectation
of privacy in that area is greater than in the other areas of
the car.

Under this view the police could inventory the

car if, in looking through the windows, they spotted items
of potential value--ie. brief case,

ca~era,

or alike.

It

would then become reasonable for them to open the car and
to secure the property.
We would then affirm this case since the contraband was
discovered in the unlocked glove compartment.

I recognize that

at some point the police should have the right to look further-with the hope of discovering additional clues to ownership.
Exactly how long that period is need not be answered in this
case:

a footnote indicating merely that at some point--a week

or so--it would become reasonable for the police to look
further is sufficient. ((Note: the police have no real need to
look in the glove compartment except in cases where the car

{

-2-

plates
has no license plates since the/ can be used to lead the
police to all of the data potentially found on the registration
that may/may not be in the glove compartment) ).

Moreover,

there obviously exist special fact situations where such
inventories may be appropriate--ie. car is obviously stolen
(of course, an argument could be made in a later case that
in those special situations one still need s a warrant prior
to entry).

Even if you disagree with the above(in that you
believe open glove compartments are different from locked
ones) I do not believe that you can join the Chief's opinion
both in view of your own past opinions and what you are writing
in the border search cases.

The principal problem with the

opinion is its revival of the "reasonableness standard" as the
key test in the Fourth Amendment area. See,

~'

T.O. at 10

("the reasonableness standard adopted by the Framers";
quotation of Black and Cooper).
mention the warrant

the

Although the opinion does

requiremen~, , it

does so only once at p.4--

the context is that the Court has approved warrantless searches
of car s in situations in which a search of home or office would
be illegal:

the implication is that searches of cars without

a warrant is always O.K.--this is not what the law

is and I

doubt if you would want it that way((Note that it would make the
discussion in the border search cases of the warrant question
rather off the point)).

This implication is not clearly

the

only one derivable: . but unless the Chief makes clear that
all the Court intends to say in this case is that no warrant
is necessary in the inventory search context, I would not join
the opinion.

[[[An even more dangerous implication of the

opinion is that the discredited Rabinowitz test of "reasonablene5'
is applicable everywhere:

since the opinion does differentiate
however,
between cars and houses at p.4,/the most reasonable implication
to be derived from the general discussion in § (3) at p. 10
is that it is limited to cars--but I think that the Chief should
make this clear.]]]
There are several other

proh~ems

that I have with the

-3-

opinion, most of which stem from the fact it never attempts
to tell us why warrants are not required in the inventory
search situation: as indicated in my original memorandum I

"

think that one can make a defensible argument that the concepts

-

-

-

of probable cause and warrants have no real place here.
is no need for a

det~hed

,__

~.-.

There

magistrate to evaluate anything.

All that the police want to do is to search a car based on their
standard operating procedures:

thereis nothing for the

magistrate to evaluate; once the police have the car that is
------~

enough.

z::wa....,

•

((There is some need, however, to distinguish the

administrative search cases where- warrants
required)i).

have been

The opinion, however, makes no effort to

explain why a warrant is not required here: the mobility of
cars and the lesser expectation of privacy have little to
do with whether a warrant of some type is necessary.

Instead,

the opinion treats the past cases as if they point inexprably
to the decision that we have reached.

But they do not clearly

do so, and instead of attempting to ~gically)analyze this

cas jf 1

the opinion slightly bends the meaning of the past decisions:
1.

At p. 5 the Chief cites Cardwell

statement by the Court

as a

that there is a lesser privacy interest

in cars. I think that we can agree that that is a correct
statement as to the view of a majority of the Court
Cardwell
the Court.
opinion.

............~*·

quote is not

~'

but the

from an opinion of

Only a plurality of 4 joined Justice Blackmun's
You wrote separately concurring in the judgment on

Bustamonte grounds.
2.

At p. 11 the use of Cooper is deceptive: the

clear implication of the paragraph and the quote is that "such
of length of time" refers to the week, when in fact, if you
read the quote in context it is referring to the 4-month
inteval prior to the forfeiture sale.

In fact, read correctly,

it reaffirms the idea that in Cooper the Court viewed the sale
as a fairly certain event--the police would be required to
hold the car the four months(((Note that even if one week were
correct, it would have little relevance here:

the police here

searched immediately; had they waited a day or two, the owner
might well have reclaimed his car))).

I

-4~

3.

FN. 9 and its "protective reasons" implications

is cute, but makes the entire opinion seem less persuasive
(the difference between rolling up the windows of a car in
the rain and then locking it

and this case is

rather great).
4.

The interpretation of Cady

is also troubling.

opinion emphasizes one line in that opinion where the

The

policemen'~

belief that there would be a gun in the trunk is stated as
an "impression"--as if there was only the vaguest notion of
this being the case and as if in Cady
fact of marginal importance only.

the Court considered this

But, at other points in

the opinion the impression is stated as a belief and, more
important, in the critical sentence of the opinion where the
holding is stated, the operative phrase is:
believed"to

conta~n

a gun.

"reasonably

See 413 U.S. at 448.

Obviously, points 1 to 4 are in most cases no
reason not to join an opinion where you agree with tre
result and there are no implications for other cases.

But

car-search cases are likely to come up in other cases and
what is said here may have bearing on them.

Moreover, it

is disconcerting to see precident used the way it is in this
opinion.

A final point:

with regard to the problems that

I have with the lack of a warrant clause discussion and the
implications for the general approach to be applied in the
Fourth Amendment area, please take a look at your opinion in
United States v. United States District Court, 407
315 (1972).

You there clearly reject

u.s.

the Rabinowitz

the circumstances--reasonableness test":

297,
"all

the Chief's opinion

does not cite Rabinowitz, but it does quote much language from
Cooper--which reiles on R--and until recently many scholars
thought that the ~ "reasonableness" approach of Cooper
was an unexplained deviation from this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.

Even if you agree with the result, we thus have several

-5options which you may want to discuss 'w ith me: concur in the
result and write separately; wait and see what the dissent says
and how the Chief responds(no response is the likely one);
have me modify his opinion and see if he takes the changes •••••
I'm happy to talk whenever you want.

"'
Greg

I. -"''' ~~"~ -\-o c:.\.ec.~ ~e n~\efs. ~ c-ec:~ ~co~

-\a ~ ~ ~ ~ -~~"'5;1" ~
~~V\c; ~ ~e~ ~.

I

~o\\c.e ~~~~~

~u:puntt

afttttrl of tfrt ~b ~tafts

'm IUl fri:ngLrn. ~. ~·
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CHAMBER S OF

June 1, 197 6

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 75-76 -- South Dakota v. Donald Opperman

•
In due time I will circulate a dissent.

~!£( ~
T.M.

J

.•
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 2, 1976

South Dakota v. Opperman
I would appreciate your drafting a concurring opinion in
the above case.
I am in accord with much of what you have said about the
CJ 1 s opinion.

Since he may well need my vote for a "Court",

and I have a sense of institutional responsibility to try to
avoid being the vote that prevents a "Court", I would like a
draft generally along the following lines:
I would join the Court's opinion on the basis of my understanding (my reading of it) that the .. language in the opinion
emphasizing the "reasonableness standard" is addressed to the
inventory search at issue in this case.

I would make clear that

absent exigent circumstances the warrant requirement normally
applies to automobiles.

I said as much in Almeida-Sanchez

and - as you indicated - I declined to adopt the "reasonableness
standard" as the sole requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
I do think it is perfectly reasonable for police to have
a policy (whether written in a formal regulation or uniformly
followed with approval of appropriate authorities) to invent0ry
the contents of a car that the police lawfully take into custody.

I

l

2.
I see no reason to require a warrant as the concept of probable
cause is irrelevant.

As you noted, there really is nothing

for the magistrate to evaluate once the vehicle is in police
custody.
I see no reason, in a brief concurring opinion, to get
into distinctions between locked and unlocked glove compartments.

In my view, given the presence of valuable objects

in plain view, the police were justified in the search.

Indeed,

apart from breaking and entering locked glove compartments and
trunks, I think people who desert automobiles on the streets
have no basis to complain if the police take a look inside.
But this is an easy case, as there were special reasons here
imposing an obligation to safeguard valuables.
I would like to make the concurrence fairly conclusory.
My object is to maintain a consistent position and keep options
open for the future.

Yet, I think the result reached in this

case is correct and in accord with the overwhelming weighf of
authority.

It also is in accord with a police practice which

seems to me generally to be in the public interest.

A law-

abiding citizens (who doesn't have heroin in his glove compartment or a hand grenade tucked under the seat) should welcome
precautions of this kind.

I do think an automobile, in this

context, is quite different from a house or a mobile home.
I also think there is a lesser expectation of privacy - as I
have said recently in the border partrol cases - with respect
to automobiles under almost every conceivable circumstances.

3.
If you can find the time to draft this (not over three
or four pages I hope) fairly promptly, I wi ll not write the
Chief a note.

I expect that a note would prompt him to make

some minor changes that may not fully preserve my position.

ss

6/2/76

lfp/S41

,,

<(

l,:"'{

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr .
\·

DATE:

June 2, 1976

-'

South Dakota v. Opperman
I would appreciate your drafting a concurring opinion in
the above case.
I am in accord with much of what you have said about the
CJ's opinion.

Since he may well need my vote for a "Court",

and I have a sense of institutional responsibility to try to
avoid being the vote that prevents a "Court", I would like a
draft generally along the following lines:
I would join the Court's opinion on the basis of my under- ,
standing (my reading of it) that the l language in the opinion
emphasizing the "reasonableness standard" is addressed to the
inventory search at issue in this case.

I would make clear that

absent exigent circumstances the warrant requirement normally
applies to automobiles.
-r;

I said as much in Almeida-Sanchez

'

and - as you indicated - I declined to adopt the "reasonableness
standard" as the sole requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
I do think it is perfectly reasonable for police to have
a policy (whether written in a formal regulation or uniformly
followed with approval of appropriate authorities to

invent~y

the contents of a car that the police lawfully take into custody.

t.,

2.
I see no reason to require a warrant as the concept of probable
cause is irrelevant.

As you noted, there really is nothing

for the magistrate to evaluate once the vehicle is in police
custody.
I see no reason, in a brief concurring opinion, to get
into distinctions between locked and unlocked glove compartments.

In my view, given the presence of valuable objects

in plain view, the police were justified

~n

the search.

Indeed,

apart from breaking and entering locked glove compartments and
trunks, I think people who desert automobiles on the streets
have no basis to complain if the police take a

look .~ inside.

But this is an easy case, as there were special reasons here
imposing an obligation to safeguard valuables.
I would like to make the concurrence
~

fai~ly

conclusory.

My object is to maintain . a consistent position and keep options
open for the future.

Yet, I think the result reached in this

case is correct and in accord with the overwhelming weigh of
authority.

It also is in accord with a police practice which

seems to me general}y to be in the public interest.

A law-

abiding citizens (who doesn't have heroin in his glove compartment or a hand grenade tucked under the seat) should welcome
precautions of this kind.

I do think an automobile, in this

context, is quite different from a house or a mobile home.
I also think there is a lesser expectation of privacy - as I
have said recently in the border parbrol cases - with respect
to automobiles under almost every conceivable circumstances.

f

l

t 1

¢,.,"

3.
If you can find the time to draft this (not over three
or four pages I hope) fairly promptly, I will not write the
Chief a note.

I expect that a note would prompt him to make

some minor changes that may not fully preserve my position.

,, L. F. P. , Jr.

ss

('

,ju.vrmu Qtll'Urlllf flr.t ~.tb ,jtat.ts
Jl'MJrittghttt. ~. <If. 2ll~'!~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 4, 1976

Re:

No.

75~76

- South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Chief:
I shall await the dissenting opinion in
this case.
Sincerely,

.,
The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

I

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Greg Palm

FROM: ~,.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Opperman

I think your proposed concurring opinion is very good
indeed.

~
1'

Apart from a few minor editing changes, and a rider for
the last half page or so, I have only one specific comment:
I would like for you to condense substantially yQur.
description of the governmental and societal interests on
pages 7 and 8.

~ Without

having reexamined the Chief's opinion,

my recollection is that he pretty well covered - at some
length - these interests. , Perhaps it would suffice, at the
end of the first full sentence on page 7 (the sentence that
ends with the words "police custody"), to add a conclusory
sentence along the following lines:
"As the Court's opinion makes clear, each of these
interests - in varying degrees - normally is implicated ., ~.
in an inventory search. In total, these are substantial
and legitimate state interests."
;~' ·':/'
-~·

I think you can "· still leave footnote 6 {possibly condensed)
·~

in the opinion, as a note, and also find an appropriate place ·
to refer to the Harvard Law Review note.

****
,

t'

2•

..
In Part I of the draft you do cite·
"warrant clause" cases.

·.~ I

a~l

of my prior

wonder whether you could not

substitute a quotation from one of

them<~·&·,

U.S. District

Court or Almeida-Sanchez) what I have said about the warrant
clause

in

the past, rather than quoting from Camara or someone

opinion?

***
My

desire, evidenced by comments a's to the last few pages

of your draft, to reduce the length of this. concurrence is
prompted - in part - by the observation being made by several
of my Brothers that all of us are tending to be too discursive
in our concurring and dissenting opinions, especially at this
season of the year.

***
As

I do not wish to delay circulation, I suggest the

following procedure:

As soon as you have made the changes ·

indicated by me, have Sally or Gail (if available) and if
not have the secretarial pool, do a double-spaced, short ·
paper copy of the opinion that can be xeroxed and circulated
the

Confe~ence

by Monday afternoon.

I have dictated a coveetig letter which I have dated
to be sent to the Chief Justice accompanying my

f

l

[~

3.
concurring opinion.

The letter will not go to the Conference.

If at least one of your colleagues has not already read
the draft, both for substance and form, we must be sure
this step is taken before the printed draft is circulated • .;·
I think you have done a fine piece of work.

ss

.... "
'

June

No. 75-76 South Dakota v. Opperman
Dear Chief:
case.

I enclose a copy of a concurring opinion

You will note that I am joining your opinion, thus
assuring - I believe - that you have a Court.
It was necessary for me to write because, as you will
recall, you and I differ as to the role and importance of
the "warrant clause" in the Fourth Amendment. What I have
written in the past might be construed as inconsistent with
the rather general treatment of "reasonableness" in your
opinion. Accordingly, I felt it necessary to restate my
position and relate it to inventory searches.
Sincerely,

.:.. t.

",•

rl

1;

.Ju.p:rmtt <!):ltltrl ct t4t ~a .Jtattg
'Jias4htght~ ~. <!):. 2llbi~;l
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 15, 1976
PERSONAL

Re:

75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Lewis:

..

Thank you for your
,. note and concurrence.
With deference I cannot agree that any additional writing
is ''necessary'' but the combination of Article III and the
First Amendment guarantees your right-to-write ! I have
tried to deal with your concerns by an addition to Note 5
(enclosed).
.

Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell

..

June 15, 1976

Re:

75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman

!i_/

(addition)

In view of the noncriminal context of inventory searches,
and the inapplicability in such a setting of the requirement of
probable cause, courts have held -- and quite correctly -- that
search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement textually is to the probable-cause concept. We have
frequently observed that the warrant requirement assures that
legal inferences and conclusions as to probable cause will be
drawn by a neutral magistrate unrelated to the criminal investigative-enforcement process. With respect to noninvestigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully within governmental
custody, however, the policies that support the warrant requirement, to which Mr. Justice Powell refers, are inapplicable.

I

t

..iltp"rtmt Qfourl of Hrt~~ .i\taftg
Jfuqmght~ ~. <If. 21l.?~~
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 16, 1976

Re:

75-76- South Dakota v. Opperman

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have made a slight addition to note 5, page 6
so that it will read as follows:

5/
In view of the noncriminal context of inventory
searches, and the inapplicability in such a setting of the
requirement of probable cause, courts have held -and quite correctly -- that search warrants are not
required, linked as the warrant requirement textually
is to the probable-cause concept. We have frequently
observed that the warrant requirement assures that
legal inferences and conclusions as to probable cause will
be drawn by a neutral magistrate unrelated to the criminal
investigative-enforcement process. With respect to
noninvestigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully
within governmental custody, however, the policies that
support the warrant requirement, to which Mr. Justice
Powell refers, are inapplicable.

Re~ f3

~tnu

<!fmttt o-f tqt ~ttiftb' ~hdtg
~MJri:ttgtllt4 l9. Qf. 2llgt~~

CHAMBERS OF

June 21, 1976

-JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-76

-

South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Chief:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

~u:prtmt

(!j:omt of tlrt ~~ ~httt.&'

Jl'ag'.£rittghtn. ~. <!J:.

2lJ,?J.I,~

CHAMI3ERS OF

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PA ~ STEVENS

June 22, 1976

Re:

75-76 - South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief

Ju~tice

Copies to the Conference

,,

.:§u:prttttt <Q:cu:rt of tqt 2ffnittb j;tatts
~asfri:nghm. tB. <q:. ZOe?'!~
CHAM BE RS OF"

.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN . .JR.

June 28, 1976

RE: No. 75-76

South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you
have prepared in the above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

.§nprtntt Q}ottrl of tltt ~~ .§ta:ftg

:Jilaglfi:nghtn. ~.

<!f.

2ll.;TJ.1~

CHAM6ERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 28, 1976

Re:

75-76 -South Dakota v. Opperman

Dear Thurgood:
I will add the following as a footnote to my opinion:

_I
The "consent" theory advanced by the
dissent rests on the assumption that the search
is exclusively for the protection of the car owner.
It is not; the protection of the municipality and th,e
officers from claims and the protection of the public
from vandals who might find a firearm, Cody v.
Dombrowski, supra, or as here,
contraband
drugs, o.'?~ C ('I.a.<:' ial.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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No. 75-76 SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this
opinion to express additional views as to why the search
conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
questions:

This inquiry involves two distinct

(i) whether routine inventory searches are

impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant.

I.
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials.

See,~·&·,

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975);

.t

•

2.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).

None

of our prior decisions is dispositive of the issue whether
1

the Amendment permits routine inventory "searches" of
2
automobiles.
Resolution of this question requires a weighing
of the governmental and societal interests advanced to
justify such intrusions against the constitutionally
protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy
of his effects.

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,

U.S.

___ , ___ (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S.
supra, at 878-879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.

891, 892 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448
(1973); Terry v .. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535.
in the Court's opinion,

see~

Cf.

As noted

at ___ , three interests

generally have been advanced in support of inventory searches:
(i) protection of the police from danger; (ii) protection
of the police against claims and disputes over lost or
stolen property;(iii) protection of the owner's property
while it remains in police

custody~Except

in rare cases,

there is little danger associated with impounding unsearched
automobiles.

But the occasional danger that may exist

cannot be discounted entirely, see Cooper v. California,

385 U.S. 58, 61-62 (1967). iince-,u;e harmful consequences
in those rare cases may be· great, and there does not appear

f I

I
l

1

3.
to be any effective way of identifying in advance those
circumstances or classes of automobile impoundments which
represent a greater risk.

Society also has an important

interest in minimizing the number of false claims filed
against police since they may diminish the community's
respect for law enforcement generally and lower department
3

morale, thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police.
It is not clear, however, how effective inventories are as
a means of discouraging fa l se claims, since such claims
need only be accompanied by an assertion that an item was
stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted
from the police records.
The protection

of the ownner's property is a significant

interest for both the policeman and the citizen.

It

is argued that an inventory is not necessary since
locked doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection
4
that the contents of a parked automobile normally .enjoy.
But many owners might leave valuables in their automobile
temporarily that they would not leave there unattended for
the several days that police custody may last.

There is thus

a substantial gain in security if automobiles are invent oried
and valuable items removed for storage.

And, while the

same se·c urity could be attained by posting a guard at the
storage lot, that alternative may be prohibitively expensive,
5
especially for smaller jurisdictions.

4.

.·

Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile.
I

Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is
I

significantly less than the traditional expectation of
I

privacy associated with the home, United States v. MartinezFuerte, supra at

; United States

J.

Ortiz, supra, at

876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417U.S. 583, 590-591 (1974)

I

(plurality opinion), the unrestrained search of an automobile and its contents in many circumstances would
constitute a serious intrusion upon the privacy of the
individual.

But such a search is not at issue in this case.

As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search here was
limited to an inventory of the unoccupied automobile and
was conducted strictly in accord with the regulations of
6

the Vermillion Police Department.
this type

Upholding searches of

thu~

provides no general license for the police
7
to examine the contents of such automobiles.
I agree with the

the Constitution

Cou~that

permits routine inventory searches, and turn next to the
question whether they must be conducted pursuant to a
warrant.
II.

While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms
8

of "unreasonable searches and seizures",

the decisions

'r •

I ,I

I
l

f
j

5.

of this Court have recognized that the definition of
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
dictates of the warrant clause.

See United States v. United

States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S., at 528.

As the Court explained in Katz v.

United States, supra, at 357, "[s]earches conducted without
warrants have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause,' Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 for the Constitution requires 'that
the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer
. be interposed between the citizen and the police . •
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S .. 471, 481-482."

Thus,

although "[s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is
not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), . . . [t]his view has
not been accepted."

United States v. United States District

Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).

See Chimel v. California,

Except in a few carefully defined

classes of cases, a search of private property without valid
consent is "unreasonable 11 unless it has been authorized by
a valid search warrant.

See,~·&·,

Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

'

I

6.

U.S., at 528; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions establish no
general "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.
See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).

Rather,

they demonstrate that "'for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses
and cars,'" Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting
Chambers v.

Marone~,

supra, at 52, a difference that may
.

9

in some cases justify a warrantless search.
The routine inventory search under consideration in
this case does not fall within any of the established
10
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
But examination
of the interests which are protected by conditioning searches
on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals that none
of these is implicated here.
upon "probable cause".

A warrant may only issue

In the criminal context the require-

ment of a warrant thus protects the individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy against the overzealous police officer.
"Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
[concerning probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and

7.

detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
I

engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

See United States
at 316-318.

Vo

United States District Court, supra,

Inventory searches, however, are not conducted

I

in order to discover evidence of crime.
not make a discretionary

determinatio~

The officer does
to search based on

I

a judgment that certain conditions are present.

Such

searches are conducted in accordance with established police
department rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile
is seized.

There are thus no special facts for a neutral

magistrate to evaluate.
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the
reasonableness of a search.
Fuerte,
Watson,

u.s. _,
u.s. ____ ,

See United States v. Martinez-

____ (1976); cf. United States v.
____ n. 22 (1976).

In the case of

an inventory search conducted in accordance with standard
police department procedures, there ·.is no significant
danger of hindsight justification.

The absence of a warrant

. will not impair the effectiveness of post-search review of
the reasonableness of a particular inventory-search.
Warrants also have been required outside the context
of a criminal investigation.

In Camara v. Municipal

Cour~,

..

8.
387 U.S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent, a warrant
was necessary to conduct an areawide building code inspection,
even though the search could be made absent cause to believe
that there were violations in the particular buildings being
searched.

In requiring a warrant the Court emphasized that

"[t]he practical effect of [the existing warrantless search
procedures had been] to leave the occupant subject to the
discretion of the official in the field", since
"When [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant
ha[d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of the
municipal code involved require[d] inspection of
his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits
of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself [was] acting
under proper authorization." Id., at 532o
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent.
The owner or prior occupant of the automobile is neither
present nor, in many cases, is there any real likelihood
that he could be located within a reasonable period of time.
More importantly, no significant discretion is placed in
the hands of the individual officer:

he usually has no
11

choice as to the subject of the search or as to its scope.
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine
inventory search in this case is constitutional.

i'

!

South Dakota v. Opperman
N-1
FOOTNOTES
1.

Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon

an area in which the privacy citizen has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy".

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347, 360 (1969)(Harlan, J.)(concurring).

Thus, despite

their benign purpose, when conducted by government officials
they constitute "searches" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n. 15 (1967); United

States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (CAS 1973); Mazzetti v.
Superior Court , 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709m710, 484 P.2d 84, 90-91
(en bane).
/
Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974)
(plurality opinion)
2.

The principal decisions relied on by the State ··to

justify the inventory search in this case, Harris v. United
States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968); Cooper v.

California, 386

U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973),
each relied in part on significant factors not found here.
Harris only involved an application of the "plain view"
doctrine.

In Cooper the Court validated an automobile

search one week after the vehicle was impounded on the
basis that the police had a possessory interest in it

based

on a state forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it
some four months until the forfeiture sale.

386

u.s.'

at

61-62 • . Finally, in Cady the Court held that the search of

i

N-2
an automobile trunk "which the officer reasonably believed
to contain a gun" was not unreasonable ' within the meaning
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See also id. at 436-437.

413 U.S., at 448.

The police in a typical inventory
I

search case, however, will have no reasonable belief as to
the particular automobile's contents.

I

And, although the

police in this case knew with certainty that there were
I

I

items of personal property within the exposed interior of
\,Uit.~- ~

""'I

c.l..-Co\Mw\~U'.S

of-~,~

.J

the car- i.e., the
~'

of the dashboard- seep. ___
1
justification
this information did not . .~
........
provide
additional/
r
~atch

for the search of the closed console glove compartment in
which the contraband was discovered.
3.

The interest in protecting the police from liability

for lost or stolen property is not relevant in this case.
Respondent's motion to suppress was limited to items inside
the automobile not in plain view.

And, the Supreme Court

of South Dakota held that the removal of objects in plain view,
and the closing of windows and locking of doors, satisfied
any duty the police department owed the automobile's owner
to protect property while in police possession. __ S.D. ___ , __
228 N.W.2d 52,_ (1975).
4.

See Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d, at

709-710, 484 P.2d,. at 90-91.
5.

See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of

Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974).

N-3
6.

A complete "inventory report" is required of all

vehicles impounded by the Vermillion Police Department.
The standard inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles'
exterior - windows, fenders, trunk, hood - apparently for
damage, and its interior, to locate "valuables" for storage.
As· part of each inventory a standard report form is completed.
The report in this case listed the items discovered in both
the automobile's interior and the unlocked glove compartment.
The only notation regarding the trunk was that it was locked.
A police officer testified that all impounded vehicles are
searched, that the search always includes the glove compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this case
because it was locked.
7.

See App. 33-34; 73-79.

As part of their inventory search the police may

discover materials such as letters o:r checkbooks that "touch
upon intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs,"
and "reveal much about a person's activities, associations,
and beliefs."

California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.

21, 78 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).

See also Fisher

v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ , ___ n. 7 (1976).

In this

case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers",
a checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security
status card.

App. 77.

There is, however, no evidence in

the record that in carrying out their established inventory
duties the Vermillion police do other than search for and

N-4
remove for storage such property, without examining its
contents.
8.

The Amendment provides that

"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
9.

This difference turns primarily on the mobility of

the automobile and the impractability of obtaining a warrant
in many

circumstances,~·&·,

Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132, 153-154 (1925), but the lesser expectation of
privacy in an automobile is also important.

See United

States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 n. 2 (1975); Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 275, 279 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring).

u.s.

See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413

433, 441-442 (1973).
10.

See, e.&., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752

(1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-300 (1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58;
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-177 (1949);
See also
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S., at 153, 156./McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-456 (1948).
United States v.

~,

476 F.2d 67, 76 (CA2 1973) (listing

f 1I

j
.(

I

N-5
then recognized exceptions to warrant requirement:

(i) hot

pursuit; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) emergency situation;
(iv) automobile search; (v) consent; and (vi) incident to
arrest).
11.

In this case, for example, the officer who

conducted the search testified that after a second ticket
had been issued for a parking violation the offending automobile was towed to the city impound lot.

The officer

further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot are
searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet"
and "all items [discovered in the vehicle] are removed for
safekeeping."

......

App. 24.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opinion to express additional views as to why the search conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant,

I
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528
(1967) . None of our prior decisions is dispositive of
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine in~
ventory "searches" 1 of automobiles.2 Resolution of this
1

Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon an area in which
t he privacy citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J.) (con~
curring) . Thus, despite their benign purpose, when conducted by
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15
(1967) ; United States v. Lawson, 487 F . 2d 468 (CAS 1973);
Mazzetti V. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-710, 484 P . 2d 84,

[Footnote 2 i,s on p. 2]

f

l

75-76-CONCUR

2

SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN

question requires a weighing of the governmental and
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions
against the constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United
U. S. - , (1976);
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. supra, at 878879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf.
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at --, three interests
generally have been advanced in support of inventory
searches: ( i) protection of the police from danger;
(ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes
90-91 (en bane). Cf. CardweU v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974)
(plurality opinion).
2 The principal decisions relied on by the State to justify the
inventory search in this case, Harris v. United States, 390 U . S.
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on significant
factors not found here. Harris only involved an application of the
"plain view" doctrine, In Cooper the Court validated an automobile search one week after the vehicle was impounded on the
basis that the police had a possessory interest in it based on a
state forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it some four months
until the forfeiture sale. 386 U. S., at 61-62. Finally, in Cady
t.he Court held that the sea.rch of an automobile trunk "which the
officer reasonably believed to contain a gun" was not unreasonable·
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
413 U. S., at 448. See also id., at 436-437. The police in a
typical inventory search cru;e, however, will have no reasonable belief
as to the particular automobile's contents. And, although the
police in this ca.se knew with certainty that there were items of
personal property within the exposed mterior of the car-i. e., the
watch of the dashboard-see p. - , ante, this information did not
in the circtunstances of this case, provide additional justification
for the search of the closed console glove compartment m which thecontraband was discovered .
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over lost or stolen property; (iii) protection of the own-·
er's property while it remains in police custody.
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the occasional danger that may exist cannot be discounted en-·
tirely. See Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62
(1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effectiVe way of identifying in advance those circumstances
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police
since they may diminish the community's respect for law
enforcement generally and lower department morale,
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police. 8 It
is not clear, however, how effective inventories are as·
a means of discouraging false claims, since such claims
need only be accompanied by an assertion that an item
was stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally
omitted from the police records.
The protection of the owner's property is a significant
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked'
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy.4 ·
But many owners might leave valuables in their automo-·
8

The interest in protecting the police from liability for lost or
stol'en property is not relevant in this case. Respondent's motion to
suppress was limited to items inside the automobile not in plain
v1ew. And, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the
removal of objects in plain view, and the closing of windows and'
'lockmg of doors, satisfied any duty the police department. owed'
the automobiles' owner to protect property while in police posse~
:non. S. D. - , - , 228 N. W. 2d 52,- (1975) .
4
See M ozzettt v. S111penor Cowrt, 4 Cal. 3d, at 709-710, 484 P~
'2'd.. at g()..-!JL
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bile temporarily that they would not leave there unattended for the several days that police custody may last.
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles
are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage.
And, while the same security could be attained
by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alternative may be prohibitively expensive, especially for
smaller· jurisdictions. 5
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile.
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is
significantly less than the traditional expectation of
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at-; United States v. Ortiz, supra,
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 5-83, 590591 (1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search
of an automobile and its contents in many circumstances
would constitute a serious intrusion upon the privacy
of the individual. But such a search is not at issue in
this case. As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied automobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department. 0 Up5 See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974).
6 A complete "mventory report" is required of all vehicles impounded by the Vermillion Police Department. The standard
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' exterior-windows,
fenders, tnmk, hood-apparently for damage, and its interior, to
locate ''valuables" for storage. As part of each inventory in standard report form is completed. The report in this case listed the
items d1scovered in both the automobile's mterior and the unlocked
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was
that it was locked. A pohce officer testified that all impounded
vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the glove
compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this case
because it was locked. See App. 33-34 ; 73-79.
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5

hoMing searches of this type thus provides no general
license for the police to examine the contents of such
automobiies. 7
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits
routine inventory searches, and turn next to the question
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrank
II
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms
of 11 unreasonab1e searches and seizures," 8 the decisions
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "rea.-·
sonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States ·:v:
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara·
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. As the Court explained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357,
"[s] earches conducted without warrants have been held.
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20',
1

As part of their inventory search the police may discover rna-·
terials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate areas
of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and belirfs." California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). See
also Fisher v. United States, U. S. - , - n. 7 (1976). In
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in·
carrymg out their established inventory duties the Vermillion police
d'o other than search for and remove for storage ~:;uch property,
without examining its contents.
8 The Amendment provides that
"The right of the people to be Recure m their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable ;;earches and seizures,.
shall not be violated and no Warrant;; shall ts;;ue, but upon probable·
cau~r, ~upported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describIng the phH'!' to be seatched, and the 12ersoos or things to be ~:;cized.'"
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6

33 for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, im:partial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed
between the citizen and the police .. ..' Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482. " Thus, although
" [s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States Dis~
trict Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. Cali~
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269
( 1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 ( 1964);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20,30 (1925).
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions estab~
lish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant re~
quirement. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364
(1964). Rather, they demonstrate that "'for the pur~
pose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional
difference between houses and cars,' " Cady v. Dombrow~
ski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, su,.
pra, at 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a
warrantless search.9
9

This difference turns primarily on the mobihty of the automobile and the impracticability of obtaimng a warrant in many
circumstances, e. g., CarroU v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153-
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The routine inventory search under consideration in
this case does not fall within any of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. 10 But examination
of the interests which are protected by conditioning,
searches on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals.
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may
only issue upon "probable cause." In the criminal context the requirement of a warrant thus protects the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences [concerning probable
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). See Unitea
States v. United States District Court, supra, at 316-318.
Inventory searches, however, are not conducted in order
to discover evidence of crime. The officer does not make
a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Such searches
are conducted in accordance with established police de154 (1925), but the lesser expecta.tion of privacy in an automobile is
also important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 n.
2 (1975) ; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality
opinion) ; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 275, 27~
(1973) (PowELL, J., concuring). See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U . S. 433,441-442 (1973).
10
See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v.
Ohib, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U . S. 294, 298-300
(1967); Cooper v. California , 386 U. S. 58 ; Brinegar v. Unitea
States, 338 U. S. 160, 174...:177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451, 454--456 (1948) ; United States v. M app, 476 F . 2d 67, '76
(CA2 1973) (listing then recognized exceptions to warrant requirement : (i) hot pursuit ; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) emergency
situation ; (iv) automobile. search ; (v) cQnsent ; arid (vi) incident
til arrest) .

75--76-CONCUR

8

SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN

partment rules or policy and occur whenever ~:~-n automobile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a
neutral magistrate to evaluate.
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the
reasonableness of a search. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States
v. Watson,- U.S.-,- n. 22 (1976). In the case
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with
tandard police department procedures, there is no significant danger of hindsight justification. The absence
of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of postsearch review of the reasonableness of a particular inventory-search.
Warrants also have been required outside the context
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent,
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building
code inspection, even though the search could be made
absent cause to believe that there were violations in the
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a war ..
rant the Court emphasized that " [ t] he practical effect
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been]
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field," since
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant
ha[d] no way knowing whether enforcement of the
municipal code involved require [ d] inspection of his
premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
ihspector's power to search, and no way of knowing
whether the inspector himself [ Wf\S] acting under
proper authorization." !d., at 532.
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent.
The owner or prior -occupant of the automobile is neither
present nor, in many cases, is there any real 'likelihood
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually
has no choice as to the subject of the search or as to its
scope.11
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inventory search in. this case is constitutional.

11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search
testified that after a second ticket had been issued for a parking
violation the offending automobile was towed to the city impound
lot.. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot
are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and
"all items [discovered in the vehicle] are removed for safekeeping."
App. 24, Seen. 6, supra.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add .this opin-ion to express additional views as to why the search conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must beconducted pursuant to a warrant.
I

The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to·
s~feguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975); Camara v. .Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528
(1967). None of our prior decisions is dispositive of
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine inventory "searches" 1 of automobiles. 2 Resolution of this
1 Routine inventories of a.utomobi.\es intrude upon an area in which
the private citizen has a "reasonable exportation of privacy."
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, despite t.hoir benign purpose, when conducted by
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15
(1967); United States v. Lawson, 487 F. 2d 468 (CA8 1973);
Mazzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-710, 484 P. 2d 84,.
[Footnote 2 is on p . 2]
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions
against the constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United
U. S. - , (1976);
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448
( 1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 ( 1968). Cf.
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at --, three interests
generally have been advanced in support of inventory
searches: (i) protection of the police from danger;
(ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes
9G-91 (1971) (en bane). Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 588, .'i91
(1974) (plurality opinion).
2 The principal decision<:: relied on by the State to justify the
inventor~' search in thi,; ease, llarris v. United States, 390 U. S.
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, il86 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v.
J)om.browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on sig.nifirant
factors not found here. Harris only involved an application of the
"pbin view" doctrine. In Cooper the Court vaJidated an automobile search that took place one week after the vehicle waR impounded on the theory thnt the poJice had a possessory interest in
the car based on a ~tate forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it
some four months until the forfeiture sale. Sec 386 U. S., at 61-62.
Finn lly, in Cady the Court held that the search of an automobile
trunk "which the ofiicer rea3onably bclic,·e to contain a gun" was
not; unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteen1 h
Amendments. 413 U. S., at 448. See also id., at 436--437. The
police in a typical il1\·entory search case, however, will haYe 110 reasonable belief as to the particular automobile's contents. And,
although the police in this case knew with certainty that there were
items of per~onal property within the exposed interior of the car1:. e., the watch on the dashboard-sec p. - , ante, this informatio11
alone did not, in the circmmtanecs of this ca~c, provide adJi1 ional
justification for the search of the cJosed ronsole gloYe compartment
in which the contraband was diseovercd.
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over ;1ost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the
owner's property while it remains in pohce custody.
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the occasional danger that may exist cannot be discounted entirely. See Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62
( 1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effective way of identifying in advance those circumstances
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police
since they may diminish the community's respect for law
enforcement generally and lower department morale,
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police." It
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there
remains the possibility of accompanying such claims with
an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted from the police records.
The protection of the owner's property is a significant
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy. 4
But many owners might leave valuables in their automoa The intere~t in protecting the police from liability for lost or
stolen property is not relevant in this ca~e. Respondent's motion to
suppress was limited to items in8ide 1 he a11tomobile not in plain
virw. And, the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that
the removal of objects in plain 1·iew, and the closing of windows and
locking of doors, satiRfied nn~r duty the polire depnrtmf'nt owed
the automobilrs' ownrr to protect property in police possession.--

S . D . - , - , 228 N. W. 2d 52,- (1975).
"See Mozzetti v. Superior Cnu.rt. 4 Cal. 3d, nt 709-710, 484 P ..
2d, n.t. 9(}....91.
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bile temporarily that , they would not leave there unatt0nded for the several days that police custody may last,
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles
are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage.
And, while the same security could be attained
by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alternative may be prohibitively expensive, especially for
smaller jurisdictions."
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile.
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is
significantly less than the traditional expectation of
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, a t - ; United States v. Ortiz, supra,
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590~
591 ( 1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a
serious intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in
many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue in
this case. As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied automobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department. 6 Up5 See Note, Warrantless Sra.rchPs nnrl. Seizures of AutomobileFi, 87
Ha.rv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (197-J.).
6
A complete "invent-ory report" is required of nil vehicles impounded by tho Vermillion Polire Depflrtment. The standard
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' exterior-windows,
fenders, trunk, and hood-apparently for damage, and its interior, to
locate "valuables" for storage. As part of each inventory a stand:ud report form is complcl ed. The report in this raRe listrd the
items discovered in both the automobile's interior and the unlocked
glove compartment. The only rJOtation regarding the trunk WflS
that it was locked. A police officer testified that all impounded
vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the glove
compartment, and that the trunk hnd not been searched in ihir; case
becnuse it was locked. Sec App. 33-34, 73-79.

,,
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holding searches of this type provides no general license
for the police to examine all the contents of such
automobiles. 7
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits
routine inventory searches, and turn next to the question
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
II
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," 8 the decisions
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. As the Court explained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357,
"[s l earches conducted without warrants have been held
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
As part of their inventory search the police may discover materials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate areas
of a.n individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U. S, 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, ,T., concurring). Sec
also Fisher v. United States, U. S. - , - n. 7 (1976). In
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in
carrying out their established inventory duties the Vermillion police
do other than search for and remove for storage such property
without examining its contents.
8 The Amendment provides that
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against tmreasonable searches and seiz11res,
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall i;;;sue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particula.rly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
7

75-76-CONCUR
6

SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN

33, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed
bet,veen the citizen and the police ... .' Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482.'' Thus, although
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]hc relevant test is not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269
(1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 (1964);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v.
Unded States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 ( 1925).
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1D25), these decisions establish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364
( 1964). Rather, they demonstrate that " 'for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional
difference between houses and cars,'" Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a
warrantless search."
9
ThiR differenee turns primarily on the mobility of the a utomobile and the imprnl'tic.a bility of obtnining a warrant in many
eircumstances, e. g., Can·oll v. Un·ited States, 267 U. S. 132, 153- ·
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The routine inventory search under consideration in
this case does not fall within any of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. 10 But examination
of the interests which are protected when searches are
conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may
issue only upon "probable cause." In the criminal context the requirement of a warrant protects the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences [concerning probable
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). See.Ae. g.,
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted
in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does
not ma.ke a discretionary determination to search based
on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with estab154 (1925) . The lesser expectation of priv:-tcy in nn automobile also
is important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891 , 896 n.
2 (1975); Cardwell v. L ewis, 417 U. S., at 590; Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U . S. 275 , 279 (1973) (PowELL, ,T., concurring) .
Sec Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 441-442 .
1 0 See, e. g., Chimel v. Cal1:jornia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) ; T erry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 29SC-300
(1967); Coop er v. California , 386 U. S. 58; Bn:negar · v. United'
States, 338 U.S . 160, 174-177 (1949) ; Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S., at 153, 156. See also M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451, 454-456 (1948) ; United States v. Mapp , 476 F. 2d 67, 76.
(CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptions to warrant requirement: (i) hot pur~ uit; (ii) plnin view doctrine; (iii) emergrn ey
situation ; (iv) automobile search ; (v) con8ent; and (vi) in cident
to arrest) .

'
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lished police department rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the
reasonableness of a search. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States
v. Watson,- U.S. - , - n. 22 (1976). In the case
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with
standard police department procedures, there is no significant danger of hindsight justification. The absence
of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of postsearch review of the reasonableness of a particular inventory search.
·w arrants also have been required outside the context
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent,
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building
code inspection, even though the search could be made
absent cause to believe that there were violations in the
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a warrant the Court emphasized that "[t]he practical effect
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been]
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field ," since
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant
haf d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of
the municipal code involved require [ d] inspection
of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits
of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself [was] acting
under proper authorization." !d., at 532.
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent.
The owner or prior occupant of the automobile is not
present, nor, in many cases, is th ere any real likelihood

.-
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually
has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope.n
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inven- .
tory search in this case is constitutional.

In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search
testified that the offending automobile was towed to the city impound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking violation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot
arc searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and
"all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for safekeeping."
App. 24. See n. 6, supra.
11

JUN 2.,. 1976

~• 1
~d DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESNo. 75- 76
South Dakota, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
Supreme Court of South
Donald Opperman.
Dakota.
blune -, 1976]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opin-ion to express additional views as to why the search conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must beconducted pursuant to a warrant.
I

The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is tosafeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528
(1967). None of our prior decisions is dispositive of
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine inventory "searches" 1 of automobiles. 2 Resolution of this
Routine inventories ·of automobiles intrude upon an area in which
the private citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."·
Katz v. United States, 389 U. 8. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, despite tl1eir benign purpose, when conducted by
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of theFourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15
(1967); United States v. Lawson, 487 F. 2d 468 (CAS 1973) ;
Mazz etti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709-710, 484 P . 2d 84~
[Footnote 2 is on p . 2]
1
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and
societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions
against the constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, U. S. - , (1976);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878879 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U . S. 433, 447-448
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf.
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at --, three interests
generally have been advanced in support of inventory
searches: (i) protection of the police from danger;
( ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes
90-91 (1971) (en bane). Cf. Ca1'dwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591
(1974) (plurality opinion).
2 The principal decisions n·Jied on by the S1a1 e to ju~tify the
inventory search in thiR case, Ilan·is v. Unit ed States, 390 U. S.
234 (1968); Coope1· v. California, 380 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 4:~3 (1973), each relied in part on s ig~1ifieant
fartors not found here. Han·is only invo]vecl an application of the
"plain view" doctrine. In Cooper the Court validated an automobile search that took place one week after the vehiele was impounded on the theory that the police had a possessory interPst in
the car based on a state forfeiture statute requiring thrm to rrtain it
some four months until the forfeiture sale. See 380 U. S., at 61-02.
Finally, in Cady the Court. held that the search of an automobile
trunk "which the officer rcaHOll:1bly believe to contain a gun" wns
not uureasonnble withi.n the meaning of the Fourth and Fourtee11th
Amendments. 413 U. S., at 448. See also 1:d., at 436-4::!7. The
police in a typical inventory search case, however, will haYe no reasonable belief ~~~ to the particular automobile's contents. And,
although t.he police in this case knew with certainty that there 'n're
items of personnl property within the cxpot>cd interior of thr rari. e., the watch on 1he dashboard-sec p. - , ante, thio information
alone did not, in the circumstances of this cnse, provide additional
justification for the search of t.hc closrd con8olc glove rom]l:utment
in which the contrrtband wns discovered.
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over , ost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the .)_
owner's property while it remains in police custody.
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the occasional danger that may exist cannot be discounted entirely. Sec Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62
( 1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effective way of identifying in advance those circumstances
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police
since they may diminish the community's respect for law
enforcement generally and lower department morale,
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police.~ It
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there
remains the possibility of accompanying such claims with
an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted from the police records.
The protection of the owner's property is a significant
interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy. 4
But many omwrs might leave valuables in their automo~ The interc:-t in protecting the police from liability for lost or
stolen pro]wrty iR not rrlrvniJt in this ca;:e. RPsponclent'R motion to
suppres.~ was limited to items in~icle the :1\ltomobilr not in plain
view. And , the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that
1he remontl of object~ in plain ,·iew, and the closing of windows :mel
lorking of door><, Fnti~fiecl an~· dut~· the polire clcp:trtment owed
thP nutomobilcs' owner to prole(·! property in police pos~c,;sion. - S . D . - , - , 22R N. W. 2d 52.- (1975).
"Sec Mozz ctti v. S11perior Cow·t. 4 C:1I. 3d, al 709-710, 4R4 P.
2d, at 90-91.
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bile temporarily that they would not leave there unattended for the several days that police custody may last.
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles
are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage.
And, while the same security could be attained
by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alternative may be prohibitively expensive, especially for
smaller jurisdictions."
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile.
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is
significantly less than the traditional expectation of
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, a t - ; United States v. Ortiz, supra,
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590591 (1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a
serious intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in
many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue in
this case. As th<:' Court's opinion emphasizes, the search
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied automobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department. 6 Up5
See Note, Warrantless Searehl'H' nnd Seizures of Automobiles. 87
Ha.rv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974).
6
A complete "inventory report" i8 requirrd of ::dl vehiclrs impotmded by the Vetmillion Polic·e Department. The st:mdard
inventory consists of a sun·cy of the vehicles' exterior-windows,.
fenders, trunk, and hood-apparently for damage, and its int.erior, to
locale "valuables" for sLomge. As part of each inventory a standard report form is completed. The report in this rase listed the
items diseovered in both tho automobile's interior and tho unlorked.
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was
that it was locked. A polirc otricer testified that all impounded
vehicles arc searched, that tho Rearch always includes the glove
compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this ease
bernuse it was locked. See App. 33-34, 73-79.
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holding searches of this type provides no general license
for the police to examine all the contents of such
automobiles. 7
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits
rou~ine inventory searches, and turn next to the question
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
II
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," 8 the decisions
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v.
United States District Cour-t, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 528. As the Court explained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357,
"[s]earches conducted without warrants have been held
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
As part; of their inventory search the police may discover materials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate arras
of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). See
also Fisher v. United States, U. S. - , n. 7 (1976). In
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in
carrying out their esta,blished inventory duties the Vermillion police
do other than search for and remove for siorage such property
without examining its contents . .
8
The Amendment provides that
"The right of the people to be secure in their personA, houses,
pn,pers, and effects, against tmrrnsonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particula.rly describing the place to be searched, :-mel tho persons or ihings to be ;;;eized."
7
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33, for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed
between the citizen and the police .... ' Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482." Thus, although
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]hc relevant. test is not
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269
(1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 (1964);
Camara v. M 'unicipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v.
United States, 260 U.S. 20,30 (192.5).
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra;
Chmnbers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions establish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. See Preston v. Um:ted States, 376 U. S. 364
( 1964). Rather, they demonstrate that " 'for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional
difference between houses and cars.' " Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maron ey, supra, at 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a
warrantless search. 9
9 This difference turn~ primarily on the mobilit~· of thr, a11tomobilo nnd tho impmcticnbility of obtnining a wnrnmt in m:1ny
t·ircumstanr es, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 207 U. S. 1:32, 153-
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The routine inventory search under consideration m
this case does not fall within any of the established exceptions to the wa.r rant requirement. 10 But examination
of the interests which are protected when searches are
conditioned on warra.n ts issued by a judicial officer reveals
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may
issue only upon "probable cause." In the criminal context the requirement of a warrant protects the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences [concerning probable
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson (':;)
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Se~ e. g., ~
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted
in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does
not make a discretionary determination to search based
on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with estab154 ( 1925). The lesser expertntion of privacy in an automobile n!Ro
is important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 n.
2 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis. 417 U.S., n,t 590; Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 275, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring).
Sec Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 441-442 .
0
" See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Ilayden, 3R7 U. S. 294, 298-300
( 1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Brinegar v. United
Stcttes, 338 U.S. H>O, 174-177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451, 454--456 (1948); United States v. Mapp, 476 F. 2d 67, 76
(CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptionR to warrant, requirement: (i) hot pur~uit. ; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) f'mcrgenry
sit.uation; (iv) automobile search; ( v) conFent.; nncl (vi) incident
to arrest).
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lished police department rules or policy and occur whenever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the
reasonableness of a search. See Un·ited States v. Martinez-Fuerte,- U . S . - , - (1976); cf. United States
v. Watson,- U . S . - , - n. 22 (1976). In the case
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with
standard police department procedures, there is no significant danger of hindsight justification. The absence
of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of postsearch review of the reasonableness of a particular inventory search.
Vl arrants also have been required outside the con text
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent,
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building
code inspection, even though the search could be made
absent. cause to believe that there were violations in the
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a warrant the Court emphasized that "[t]he practical effect
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been]
to leave the occupm1t subject to the discretion of the official in the field," since
"when [an] insprctor demands entry, the occupant
ha[d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of
the municipal code involved require [ d] inspection
of his premises, no wa.y of knowing the lawful limits
of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself [was l acting
under proper authorization." I d., at 532.
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent.
The owner or prior occupant of the automobile is not
present, nor, in many cases, is there any real likelihood

-.
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually
has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope. 11
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inventory sea.rch in this case is constitutional.

11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search
testified that the offending automobile was towed to the city impound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking violation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot
are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and
"all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for safekeeping."
App. 24. Seen. 6, supra.
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MR. JusTICE Pow:mLJ.., concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opinion to express additional views as to why the search conducted in this case is valid under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This inquiry involves two
distinct questions: (i) whether routine inventory searches
are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they must be·
conducted pursuant to a warrant.

I
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials. See, e. g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528
(1967) . None of our prior decisions is dispositive of
the issue whether the Amendment permits routine inventory "searches" 1 of automobiles.2 Resolution of this
1 Routine inventories of automobiles int rude upon an area in whlch
the private citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, despite their benign purpose, when conducted by
government officials they constitute "searches" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. See T erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 n. 15
(1967) ; United Stat es v. Lawson, 487 F . 2d 468 (CAS 1973);
Mazzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 709- 710, 484 P . 2d 84,
[Footnote 2 w on p 2]
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question requires a weighing of the governmental and
,societal interests advanced to justify such intrusions
!1-gainst the constitutionally protected interest of the in~
dividual citizen in the privacy of his effects. United
~tates v. Martinez-Fuerte, U. S. - , (1976);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878-,
~79 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 892
(1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447-448
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Cf,
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-535. As noted
in the Court's opinion, see ante, at - , three interests
generally have been advanced in support of inventory
searches: (i) protection of the police from danger;
(ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes
g(}-.91 (1971) (en bane). Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591
( 197 4) (plurality opinion) .
2 The principal decisions relied on by the State to justify the
inventory search in this case, Harris v. United States, 390 U. S.
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on significant
factors not found here. Harris only involved an application of the
"plain view" doctrine. In Cooper the C<>urt validated an automobile search that took place one week after the vehicle was impounded on the theory that the police had a possessory interest in
the car based on a state forfeiture statute requiring them to retain it
some four months until the forfeiture sale. See 386 U. S., at 61-62.
Finally, in Cady the Court held that the search of an automobile
trunk "which the officer reasonably believe to contain a gun" was
not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 413 U. S., at 448. See also id., at 436-437. The
police in a typical inventory search case, however, will have no reasonable belief as to the particular automobile's contents. And,
although the police in this case knew with certainty that there were
items of personal property within the exposed interior of the cari. e., the watch on the dashboard-see p. -, ante, this information
alone did not, in the circumstances of this case, provide additional
justification for the search of the closed console glove compartment
in which the contraband was discovered.
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over lost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the
owner's property while it remains in police custody.
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated
with impounding unsearched automobiles. But the occasional danger that may exist cannot be discounted en:
tirely. See Cooper v. California, 385 U. S. 58, 61-62
( 1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases
may be great, and there does not appear to be any effective way of identifying in advance those circumstances
or classes of automobile impoundments which represent a
greater risk. Society also has an important interest in
minimizing the number of false claims filed against police
since they may diminish the community's respect for law
enforcement generally and lower department morale,
thereby impairing the effectiveness of the police. 3 It
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there
remains the possibility of accompanying such claims with
an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted from the police records.
The protection of the owner's property is a significant
Interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is
argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked
doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection
that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy. 4
But many owners might leave valuables in their automo-

•

3 The interest in protecting the police from liability for lost or
stolen property is not relevant in this case. Respondent's motion to
suppress was limited to items inside the automobile not in plain
view. And, the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that
the removal of objects in plain view, and the closing of windows and
locking of doors, satisfied any duty the police department owed
the automobiles' owner to protect property in police possession. - S. D. - , - , 228 N. W. 2d 52,- (1975) .
4
See M ozzetti v. Superior Cov,rt, 4 Cal. 3d 1 at 709-710, 484 P,
2d, at 90-91 •
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bile temporarily that they would not leave there unat..
tended for the several days that police custody may last.
There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobile&
11re inventoried and valuable items removed for storage.
And, while the same · security could be attained
py posting a guard at the storage lot, that alternative may be prohibitively expensive, especially for
smaller jurisdictions. 5
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile.
Although the expectation of privacy in an automobile is
significantly less than the traditional expectation of
privacy associated with the home, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at-; United States v. Ortiz, supra,
at 876 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590591 ( 1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained search
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a
serious intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in
many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue in
this case. As the Court's opinion emphasizes, the search
here was limited to an inventory of the unoccupied automobile and was conducted strictly in accord with the
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department. 6 Up5 See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 835, 853 (1974) .
6 A complete "inventory report" is required of all vehicles impounded by the Vermillion Police Department. The standard
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicles' exterior-windows,
fenders, trunk, and hood-apparently for damage, and its interior, to
locate "valuables" for storage. As part of each inventory a standard report form is completed. The report in this case listed the
items discovered in both the automobile's interior and the unlocked
glove compartment. The only notation regarding the trunk was
that it was locked. A police officer testified that all impounded
vehicles are searched, that the search always includes the glove
compartment, and that the trunk ha.d not been searched in this case
because it was locked. See App. 33-34, 73-79.
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holding searches of this type provides no general license
for the police to examine all the contents of such
automobiles. 7
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits
routine inventory searches, and turn next to the question
whether they must be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
II

•

While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," 8 the decisions
of this Court have recognized that the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific
dictates of the warrant clause. See United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528. As the Court explained in Katz v. United States, supra, at 357,
11
[s]earches conducted without warrants have been held
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause,' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
7 As part of their inventory search the police may discover materials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate areas
of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 78 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring). See
also Fisher v. United States, U. S. - , n. 7 (1976). In
this case the police found, inter alia, "miscellaneous papers," a
checkbook, an installment loan book, and a social security status
card. App. 77. There is, however, no evidence in the record that in
carrying out their established inventory duties the Vermillion police
do other than search for and remove for storage such property
without examining its contents.
8 The Amendment provides that
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath 'or affirmation, and particularly describin~ the place tQ be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
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for the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, im-:
partial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed
between the citizen and the police ... .' Wong Sun v1
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482." Thus, although
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is no~
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable, United States v,
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), ... [t]his view has
not been accepted.'" United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 315 and n. 16. See Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without valid consent is "unreasonable" unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 269
(1973); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486 (1964);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528; United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20,30 (1925).
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a
search of a home or office, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), these decisions establish no general "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364
(1964). Rather, they demonstrate that "'for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional
difference between houses and cars,' " Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S., at 439, quoting Chambers v. Maroney, supra, a.t 52, a difference that may in some cases justify a
warrantless search.9
9 This difference turns primarily on the mobility of the automobile and the impracticability of obtaining a warrant in many
circumstances, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153-
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The routine inventory search under consideration in
this case does not fall within any of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement. 10 But examination
of the interests which are protected when searches are
conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may
issue only upon "probable cause." In the criminal context the requirement of a warrant protects the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy against the
overzealous police officer. "Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences [concerning probable
cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). See, e. g.,
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted
in order to discover evidence ·of crime. The officer does
not make a discretionary determination to search based
on a judgment that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with estab154 (1925). The lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile also
is important. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 n.
2 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S., at 590; Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 275, 279 (1973) (PoWELL, J., concurring).
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S., at 441-442.
10 See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298--300
(1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 174-177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S., at 153, 156. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451, 454-456 (1948) ; United States v. Mapp, 476 F . 2d 67, 76
(CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptions to warrant requirement : (i) hot pursuit; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii) emergency
situation; (iv) a-utomobile searchj (v) consentj a-nd (vi) incident
to arrest).
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lished police department rules or policy and occur when.r
ever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special'
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to·
prevent hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the·
reasonableness of a search. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,- U.S.-,- (1976); cf. United States ·
v. Watson,- U. S. - , - n. 22 (1976). In the case·
of an inventory search conducted in accordance with
standard police department procedures, there is no significant danger of hindsight justification. The absence
.of a warrant will not impair the effectiveness of postsearch review of the reasonableness of a particular inventory search.
Warrants also have been required outside the context
of a criminal investigation. In Camara v. Municipal'
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that, absent consent,
a warrant was necessary to conduct an areawide building
code inspection, even though the search could be made
absent cause to believe that there were violations in the
particular buildings being searched. In requiring a warrant the Court emphasized that " [t] he practical effect
of [the existing warrantless search procedures had been]
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field," since
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant
ha[d] no way of knowing whether enforcement of'
the municipal code involved require[d] inspection
of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits
of t,he inspector's power to search, and no way of'
knowing whether the inspector himself [was] acting
under proper authorization." I d. , at 532.
In the inventory search context these concerns are absent.
The owner or prior· occupant of the automobile is not .
present, nor, in many cases, is there any real likelihood"
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that he could be located within a reasonable period of
time. More importantly, no significant discretion is
placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually
has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope. 11
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inven•
tory search in this case is constitutional.

11 In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search
testified. that the offending automobile was towed to the city impound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking violation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot
are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory sheet" and·
"all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for safekeeping,"'
App .. 2:4. Seen. 6, supra •.

